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A DEFINITION OF BELIEVING 
R. G. Cronin 
It is the aim of this paper to present a formally 
correct and materially adequate analysis of what it is 
to believe paradigmatically that p. The object of the 
analysis is believing as opposed to belief because we 
make a mistake if we attempt to say what belief is, in-
dependent of the believing person. There are no beliefs 
independent of a believing person. Any adequate analysis 
of belief must take the role of the person into account. 
The adequacy of the analysis will be tested by showing 
how it resolves or sheds light on certain problems having 
to do with belief, namely, the problem of self-deception, 
Pascal's wager, Moore's paradox and the notion of degrees 
of belief. 
The thesis to be defended is that A believes that p 
if and only if A is sincerely disposed to affirm that p 
is true. Although this brief statement has the air of 
the trivial and philosophically uninteresting about it, 
the unpacking of it leads to the resolution of several 
important problems. The thesis has three parts, (1) the 
affirmation that p is true, (2) the dispositional nature 
of believing and (3) the sincerity of the affirmation. 
Each part will be argued separately. 
The Affirmation that p_ is True 
To affirm that p is to affirm that p is true. The 
denial of this equivalence leads to an absurdity. Only 
a being with a concept of truth can, without equivoca-
tion, be said to have beliefs. (The problem of animal 
"beliefs" will be dealt with later.) A being with a 
concept of truth is necessarily a being with a concept of 
a bearer of truth and falsity, e.g. a statement, sentence, 
proposition, judgment, etc. That which is believed must 
be capable of being true or false. I cannot believe "Is 
the door closed?" or "Close the door." Not being bearers 
of truth or falsity, these sentences are not objects of 
belief. Statements like "I believe Jones" or "I believe 
in flying saucers" do not have apparent bearers of truth 
or falsity as their objects, but it is clear that what 
is meant is "I believe what Jones says" and "I believe 
that flying saucers exist" in the two cases respectively. 
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Exactly what we are doing in saying that something 
is true was spelled out by J. L, Austin. Austin's 
analysis of what it means to say thatp is true rests on 
six concepts: descriptive conventions, demonstrative con-
ventions, sentences, statements, kinds of situations and 
actual situations. He writes 
Descriptive conventions [are those) correlating 
words (^sentences) with types of situation, thing, 
event, etc., to be found in the world. Demonstra-
tive conventions [are those] correlating the words 
(^statements) with historic situations, e t c , to 
be found in the worldI 
A statement is said to be true when the historic 
state of affairs to which it is correlated by 
demonstrative conventions (the one to which it 
•refers') is of a type with which the sentence 
used in making it is correlated by descriptive 
conventions. 
In a following footnote Austin explains what he means 
by "is of a type." 
"Is of a type with which" means "is sufficiently 
like those standard states of affairs with which." 
Thus for a statement to be true, one state of 
affairs must be like certain others, which is 
a natural relation, but also sufficiently like 
to merit the same "description," which is no 
longer a purely natural relation. 
In terms of Austin's analysis, to affirm that p is 
true is to make two assertions, (1) that the actual 
situation a is of a certain kind or type K, and (2) that 
situations of kind K are correlated by descriptive con-
ventions with the sentence p. To say that the actual 
situation a is of kind K is to say that it is sufficiently 
like standard cases of K-kind situation to merit the 
same description. In attempting to determine the truth 
about some actual situation there are then two questions: 
(1) what we can characterize as the semantic issue, which 
is "What sentence is correlated with the kind of situation 
of which the actual situation is an instance?" and (2) 
what we can call the instantial issue, which is the ques-
tion "Of what kind or type of situation is the actual 
situation an instance?" The term "semantic issue" was 
chosen because it can be argued that we explain the mean-
ing of a sentence to someone by telling him the kind of 
situation in (an instance of) which that sentence can be 
used to make a true statement. The meaning of the * 
sentence can then be understood as being a matter of 
that kind of situation. A completely developed argument 
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for this thesis would at present take us too far afield, 
but the point can be made briefly by a reductio ad 
absurdum argument. Imagine that a person knows the mean-
ing of the sentence "p" but does not know the kind of 
situation in which that sentence can be used to make a 
true statement. For example, the German teacher places 
a book on the table and asks a student, "Das Buch is auf 
dem Tisch, nicht wahr?" The student is unable to answer. 
The teacher asks if he knows what the sentence means. 
The student says yes. After establishing that there is 
nothing wrong with the student's vision, the question 
arises as to what other grounds there could be to say 
that the student does not know the meaning of the sentence. 
In other words, it is being argued that it cannot both be 
true that someone knows the meaning of a sentence and 
that he not know when that sentence can be used to make 
a true statement. If it is insisted that they can both 
be true the question arises, what else could serve as a 
sufficient reason for saying that a person does not know 
the meaning of the sentence. 
In order to affirm that p is true a person must know 
what the standard types or kinds of situations, things, 
events, etc. with which the sentence p is correlated are. 
We make a mistake in a given situation if we attempt to 
settle the instantial issue before we settle the semantic 
issue. We cannot make the judgment that "Zeno stepped 
into the same river twice" is true until we settle the 
semantic issue, i.e. until we settle the question what 
kind of situation is going to be correlated with the 
sentence "A man stepped into the same river twice." This 
is another way of saying that we must settle the rules of 
our language governing the use of a sentence before we 
can make the judgment that those rules are being obeyed 
in a particular situation. The abortion controversy can 
be understood in light of this distinction. The question 
is, "Is a fetus sufficiently like a human being to merit 
the same description (and hence have the right to pro-
tection of the law)?" To be sufficiently alike to merit 
the same description, as Austin points out, is not a 
purely natural relation. The role of convention is to 
allow us to delineate rules for the application of sen-
tences when the degrees of resemblance among kinds of 
situations is not sufficiently clear to base our dis-
tinctions on the kinds of situations themselves. The 
rules governing the application of a sentence to particu-
lar situations are neither true nor false. They are good 
or bad depending upon whether they allow us to make the 
distinctions we wish (find relevant) on the bases of the 
differences we detect. 
When none of the sentences in what we might call our 
"sentential repertoire" is applicable without equivoca-
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tion to a particular situation, we must coin new terms or 
sentences (to be correlated by descriptive conventions 
with situations of that kind). 
A person who affirms that p is true is then affirm-
ing that the actual situation (designated by some hitherto 
unexplained process involving demonstrative conventions) 
is affirming that according to the rules governing the 
use of the sentence "p", "p" can be used to make a true 
statement in this situation because the actual situation 
sufficiently resembles other situations (in which "p" 
can be used to make true statements) to merit the same 
description. 
The Dispositional Nature of Belief 
It is not sufficient for a person to affirm that p 
is true in order to be said to believe it. Rather he 
must be disposed to do so. To illustrate, suppose that 
we ask Jones what he thinks about the possibility of 
rain. Jones proceeds to check the barometer, survey the 
horizon and call the Weather Service. He finds that the 
barometer has fallen, there are black clouds on the 
horizon and the Weather Service predicts rain with a 
99% probability. He then says, "Yes, I think it will 
rain." Imagine that minutes later Smith comes along 
and he asks Jones what Jones thinks about the possibility 
of rain. Instead of replying quite readily that he 
thinks it will, he goes through a process of checking the 
barometer, surveying the horizon and calling the Weather 
Service. Only then, after evaluating again the informa-
tion, does he say, "Yes, I think it will." In such a 
case it would be erroneous to say that Jones believed 
that it was going to rain. Rather we should say that on 
two different occasions he judged that it was going to 
rain. Judging is episodic while believing is disposition-
al. We are tempted to say that Jones believed that it 
was going to rain because usually the exercise of judgment 
results in the acquisition of belief. We usually acquire 
the disposition to affirm that p is true when we make the 
judgment that p is true. But the point of the illustra*-
tion is that Jones did not have the disposition to affirm 
that it was true that it was going to rain. He had to 
re-judge the statement. 
There is an episodic sense of the word "believe" 
by which we mean the acquisition of belief as in "Is 
that Brown?" "Yes, I believe it is." But this is a 
needless equivocation. We have a perfectly good word 
in "judge" to be used in such circumstances. 
The Sincerity of the Affirmation 
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It is not sufficient to be disposed to affirm that 
p is true in order to be said to believe it. Rather 
there must.be a sincere disposition to affirm it. The 
analysis of the sincerity of the disposition by far sheds 
the most light on the nature of believing. 
A person who wanted to deceive us about his beliefs 
might be disposed to affirm that p is true without actual-
ly believing it. Similarly a person who is self-deceived 
might affirm that p is true to himself and yet might 
still be said not to believe it. Indeed, locutions of 
the sort "You don't really believe that?" have meaning 
precisely because we can conceive of what it is for a 
person to affirm to himself that p is true but not be 
sincere in doing so. The lack of sincerity is sufficient 
grounds for denying that he actually believes what he 
publicly and privately affirms. The question then be-
comes "Under what conditions can we judge that someone, 
including ourselves, is sincere in his or her affirmation 
that p is true?" 
The desire to be deceptive is one explanation of why 
someone would be disposed to affirm that p is true when 
he did not in fact believe it. In seeking another ex-
planation of why someone would be disposed to affirm that 
p is true, we seek another end which is desired. To be 
deceptive is one end served by being disposed to affirm 
that p is true. If a person is, however, sincere in his 
disposition to affirm that p is true then there must be 
some other end served to explain the disposition which 
is characteristic of sincerity. If we consider the list 
of those ends which have traditionally been called ends 
in themselves, more often than not, knowledge is on it. 
The desire to think as being the case that which is the 
case (with appropriate justification for doing so!T*~has 
traditionally been one of those ends which is considered 
an end in itself. One cannot prove that a given end is 
an end itself but one can hardly deny that knowledge has 
been pursued as such. In believing, we have a similar 
end in view. In believing, we wish to affirm to be true 
propositions which are in fact true with appropriate 
justification for doing so. The kind of justification 
appropriate to attaining a state of knowledge is not 
necessarily identical with the justification appropriate 
to belief. In believing we have to settle for a second 
best (as H. H. Price puts i t 2 ) . We cannot be sure that 
we have attained the end, in this sense, of conforming 
our minds to reality. But that is, at least, the end we 
have in mind in adopting a belief in the first place. 
We explain actions often in terms of citing the end 
served by the action. It is being argued that we explain 
believing in the same way, i.e. by citing the end served 
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by believing. That end is, we hope, the end of conforming 
our minds to reality. We also explain an action by citing 
the prevailing circumstances which we see as evidence that 
undertaking that action will effect the end aimed at by 
the action. For example, we might explain our action of 
exercising by citing the end of attaining good health 
(an end in itself) and pointing out that exercise promotes 
the end of attaining good health. We explain the act of 
believing by pointing out the end aimed at, the conformity 
of mind to reality, and explain the act of assent on the 
basis of the evidence which we have that believing this 
proposition will effect the end of conforming our minds 
to reality. Conforming one's mind to reality can be 
understood as affirming of propositions which are in fact 
true that they are in fact true. Thus it is argued that 
for a person to be sincere in his disposition to affirm 
that p is true, he must have acquired that disposition 
out of a desire to conform his mind to reality. The 
desire need not of course be conscious, not any more than 
we have to have the conscious desire to attain the end in 
itself in the execution of any action. 
In contrast to the end of conforming one's mind to 
reality, the person who is self-deceived can be seen as 
adopting beliefs in the pursuit of a different end. 
Characteristically, a self-deceived person is one who 
seeks to avoid the acceptance of a proposition as true 
when the acceptance of that proposition will result in 
that person's undergoing some sort of mental suffering. 
The person suffering from a terminal disease who believes 
that he is going to recover despite overwhelming evidence 
to the contrary is not a person who sincerely wants to 
conform his mind to reality. Similarly the mother who 
refuses to believe that her son is guilty of some crime 
despite the evidence is not trying to conform her mind 
to reality so much as she is attempting to avoid mental 
suffering. We judge that a person sincerely wishes to 
effect that end. The best way of conforming one's mind 
to reality is to believe only those propositions for 
which the evidence is sufficiently strong to justify 
discounting alternative hypotheses. How strong that 
evidence need be is not a question that can be addressed 
here. The relevant point being made here is that we 
have grounds for judging that we ourselves, or someone 
else, are self-deceived when the belief is based upon 
evidence which does not meet our ordinary standards for 
assenting and when there is some other end served by 
the belief, usually the avoidance of some sort of mental 
suffering. 
In summary then we can say that A believes that p if 
and only if A is sincerely disposed to affirm that p is 
true. A is sincere in his affirmation if and only if he 
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makes his affirmation out of a desire to affirm as being 
true propositions which are in fact true. A person sin-
cerely wills the end of affirming to be true propositions 
which are in fact true if and only if he uses the best 
available means for effecting that end. The best avail-
able means for effecting such an end is to adopt beliefs 
on the basis of the best evidence evaluated on the basis 
of established epistemic principles. 
This definition of what believing that p amounts to 
subsumes some but perhaps not all cases of knowledge. 
It is questionable whether or not one can choose not to 
know. Suppose I want to know the sum of a column of 
multi-digit figures. I add them up, check my addition, 
re-check via an adding machine several times and have 
my results checked again by another party, who has been 
consistently reliable and who uses the same methods. 
The result is always the same. At such a point I take it 
that a knowledge claim is justified. Suppose, however, 
I am a very cautious person. I am plagued by doubts 
that the same calculative error was made every time. I 
cannot sincerely affirm that it is true that this is the 
correct result. I cannot "close the book" on the issue 
in the adoption of belief. If such a case is conceivable, 
it would be the case that I would not believe What I can 
be said to know. In order to segregate belief from 
knowledge the definition of believing can be amended as 
follows: a person believes that p if and only if he is 
sincerely disposed to affirm that p is true and to 
acknowledge that it is compatible with all he knows that 
not-p. This amendment precludes one from saying that he 
believes statements that he knows. If a person knows 
that p it cannot be compatible with all he knows that 
not-p. 
It follows from the analysis of sincerity that a 
person who believes that p in paradigm cases has good 
grounds for believing that p but if it is compatible 
with all a person knows that not-p, it follows that there 
is a risk in believing. A theory of justification of 
belief is then one which would answer the question, "When 
despite the risk of being wrong is one justified in be-
lieving that p on the basis of the available evidence?" 
The foregoing theory is not a free assent theory. 
We are not free to believe whatever we want because we 
are not free to have any evidence we want. The theory 
is better characterized as a free "dissent" theory. We 
are not constrained to believe any proposition because 
in believing we take the risk of being wrong. Nothing 
can force us to take that risk. Some philosophers have 
taken positions incompatible with this. Anyone espousing 
a causal theory of belief takes the position that belief 
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is caused either by having perceptions or by having suf-
ficient evidence that some proposition is true. To re-
fute such theories we have only to point out that one 
may, like Karl Popper, eschew the entire practice of 
having beliefs at all. Echoing E. H. Forster, Popper 
says that he does not believe in belief.3 if perceptions 
or awareness of evidence cause belief, it follows that 
either Popper has no perceptions or is not aware of any 
evidence or he is not being candid in saying that he does 
not believe in belief. Popper is interested in knowledge 
and will not settle for a second best. Those espousing 
a causal theory of belief would argue that I am presently 
constrained to believe that there is a white piece of 
paper now before me. If I do not know that it is a white 
piece of paper i.e. if there is room to doubt (e.g. it 
could be some substance which resembles paper) why would 
anyone have to ignore that doubt and assent to that propo-
sition? If there were no room for doubt, it would be 
another story but if there were no room for doubt I would 
be logically committed to claiming to know that there is 
a white piece of paper now before me. If perception or 
having sufficient evidence were said to cause one to have 
inclinations to believe (as D. M. Armstrong-* says of 
perception), the theory would be compatible with the free 
dissent theory here developed. 
The adequacy of this view of belief will now be 
tested by showing how it resolves certain problems having 
to do with belief. The problem of self-deception has 
already been discussed. 
Pascal's Wager 
Pascal argues that one should believe in God in 
effect, because a person has the best chance of maximizing 
utility for himself by doing so. Assuming that those who 
do not believe in God will suffer the loss of heaven or 
worse, Pascal argues that the potential gain to be 
realized from believing in God far outweighs the potential 
gain from not believing in God. Believing in God is seen 
as making an investment. If God exists, believing that 
he does will result in infinite return on a finite in-
vestment. While if you do not believe in God and He 
does exist, any finite gain you may have made from the 
lack of belief will be far outweighed by the infinite 
loss. If God does not exist, you may realize a finite 
gain from believing that he does not (although the 
anxiety arising from any guilt may negate even this) and 
if He does not exist and you believe that He does, you 
may suffer a finite loss (although this may be offset by 
the comfort you take in your belief) but you will never 
know you have taken the loss. 
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Given a free assent theory of belief. Pascal makes 
perfectly good sense. But the interesting thing about 
believing that God exists on the basis of possible degree 
of utility is that whether or not God does exist is en-
titely irrelvant to the fact one should believe that He 
does. To adopt such a belief would be to deny that one 
was believing for the sake of conforming one's mind to 
reality. We have already seen that adopting beliefs for 
the sake of avoiding mental anguish constitutes self-
deception. Believing that God exists on the basis of 
Pascal's wager is to believe something which one does 
not think is true (as opposed to thinking it is not 
true). It is difficult to conceive of what it means to 
believe something when it is not the case that one thinks 
it is true. 
Moore 1s Paradox 
There is no contradiction in saying that p is true 
but A does not believe that p. There is nothing incon-
sistent in a proposition's being true but my not be-
lieving it. But if I were to assert that p is true (but 
I do not believe that it is) I would not then be assert-
ing a contradiction. But what would I be asserting? 
According to the analysis offered if I say that I believe 
that p I say that I am sincerely disposed to affirm that 
it is true. To say that p is true but I do not believe 
it is to say that p is true but I am not disposed to 
affirm that p is true. In affirming that p is true I 
am doing what I am denying I am disposed to do. It can-
not both be true that I affirm that p is true and that 
I am not disposed to affirm that it is. In this sense, 
Moore's paradox is really a contradiction. It is like 
saying "I never say anything." 
Degrees of Belief 
If the foregoing analysis is correct, it follows 
that there is no such thing as degrees of belief. 
Either a person is disposed to affirm that p is true or 
he is not. There is no question of degree in this. What 
does admit of degree is the amount of evidence a person 
had in support of his belief and the amount of evidence 
which would be required for a person to alter his belief. 
In cases of rational belief the strength of evidence 
which is required to alter a belief is proportional to 
the strength of evidence in support of it. A weakly 
held belief is one for which I have only a modicum of 
evidence and for which I would only require a little 
evidence to change. A strongly held belief is one for 
which I have a great deal of evidence and require strong 
evidence to change. A strongly held irrational belief 
is one which I might not alter no matter what the 
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evidence/ i.e. one wherein the amount of evidence re-
quired to alter the belief is not proportional to the 
amount of evidence in favor of it. The only thing which 
admits of degree is the strength of evidence required 
for revision and this is what is referred to by "degree 
of belief." 
The Problern of Linguistic Inadequacy 
We can attach some sense of the word "believe" to 
cases wherein the alleged believer does not possess the 
ability to formulate his belief in words. We can make 
some sense of someone's saying, "My cat's behavior in-
dicates to me that he believes that he is about to be 
fed." But would such a person say "My cat's behavior 
indicates to me that he believes that it is true that 
he is about to be fed." The reticence a person would 
have about talking in this way reflects the association 
one must make between beliefs and objects of belief as 
bearers of truth and falsity. Do cats have objects of 
belief which are bearers of truth and falsity? If so, 
what are they? We have to grant that animals can make 
judgments with respect to the instantial issue, i.e. 
they can judge that a particular situation is of a cer-
tain kind. The cat might be said to be judging the 
present circumstances to be sufficiently like past cir-
cumstances wherin he was fed to merit the same be-
havior. Indeed tests of animal intelligence rely on 
the assumption that animals can learn to judge particu-
lar situations to be of certain kinds, e.g. the animal 
learns always to choose the right hand side of a T-maze 
in order to get food. But to insist that such behavior 
is logically adequate for the ascription of belief is 
quite another matter. Granted, with beings possessing 
linguistic ability, behavior is usually indicative of 
belief. This is because people usually act in accordance 
with their beliefs. And when there is a discrepency 
between a person's avowed beliefs and his behavior, we * 
usually take his behavior to be more indicative of his 
sincere beliefs than what he says. But it is conceivable 
that there be a discrepency between a person's rational 
belief and his irrational behavior (irrational by virtue 
of the fact that it.is incompatible with his rational 
belief). To say that a person's beahvior is logically 
adequate for the ascription of belief, is to deny that 
it is possible for a person to act irrationally. Further 
we often act on propositions which we do not believe but 
to which we attach a high probability. The gambler can 
make reasonable bets on the probabilities of certain 
alternatives but refrain from adopting any beliefs about 
what the actual results will be, e.g. as in betting on 
a horse. 
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One may even act on propositions which are believed 
to be false. A doctor may operate on a patient to save 
the latter's life even though he believes the patient 
will die anyway. In such a case the degree of utility 
which may possibly be realized justifies the action and 
not the probability of success. 
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